Iowa Voters

Why are so many things secret about the elections? THe secret software that runs voting machines isn’t the only thing being kept from the public:

Debate watchdog group Open Debates calls on the Commission on Presidential Debates to make public the secret debate contract negotiated by the Obama and McCain campaigns.

Senator Lindsay Graham of the McCain campaign and Representative Rahm Emanuel of the Obama campaign have negotiated a detailed contract that dictates the terms of the 2008 presidential debates, including who can participate and the structure of the formats. The Commission on Presidential Debates has agreed to implement the debate contract.

Yet, in order to shield the major party candidates from criticism, the Commission on Presidential Debates has refused to release the debate contract to the public.

”It is vital that the public has full access to information in a sound democracy,” said George Farah, executive director of Open Debates. “Unfortunately, the Commission on Presidential Debates is more concerned with the partisan interests of the two candidates than the democratic interests of the public, and it has denied voters access to critical information about our most sacred political forums.”

The Commission on Presidential Debates was created by and for the Republican and Democratic Parties. In 1986, the Republican and Democratic National Committees ratified an agreement “to take over the presidential debates” from the League of Women Voters. Fifteen months later, then-Republican Party chair Frank Fahrenkopf and then-Democratic Party chair Paul Kirk incorporated the Commission on Presidential Debates. Fahrenkopf and Kirk still co-chair the Commission on Presidential Debates, and every four years, it implements and conceals contracts jointly drafted by the Republican and Democratic nominees.

A copy of the 2004 debate contract negotiated by the Bush and Kerry campaigns is available at:
http://www.opendebates.org/news/documents/debateagreement.pdf

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One secret is out: They are keeping Libertarian Bob Barr off the stage despite public support for including him. He’s on the ballot in most states.

from OVC
GRANITE BAY, CA — John Edwards has become the first presidential candidate to support “open source code” for election systems. In a letter dated June 21st addressed to Alan Dechert, the Edwards campaign stated that, “To ensure security, these machines should be programmed with an open source code for complete transparency, and election results should be safeguarded by voter-verified paper records.”

Currently, software used in election systems remains the proprietary property of vendors. This situation has created a continual problem when anomalous results have been reported and independent experts are denied the ability to review how the systems work. A growing body of critics oppose this privatization of the voting system.

“Open source” means that the computer instructions written by programmers are publicly available. Open source software is rapidly replacing proprietary software in other applications, including the Internet and military applications.

“We congratulate Senator Edwards for taking a leadership role in the fight to restore public oversight of the voting system,” said Alan Dechert, president of Open Voting Consortium.

Barak Obama in Boone this week:

He was asked what can be done to restore America’s democracy. That brought up the election issues.
“I want to make sure the voting system has integrity,” he responded. “There needs to be a paper trail for every vote,” pointing out that much of today’s voting is done on electronic voting machines.

Reported in the Ogden Reporter.

How much allegiance do legislators owe to their campaign contributors?

Essential Estrogen has chided Rep. Dawn Pettengill for her opposition to the union shop bill known as Fair Share, saying “You Gotta Dance With Them What Brung Ya.” EE points to Pettengill’s sources of campaign contributions and suggest she owes them her vote.

So contributors are more important than constituents?

Contributors are indeed out to buy influence, but legislators are under no moral obligation to sell out when they accept contributions. It’s a gamble on the part of the contributors (with the odds in their favor). How else can candidates proceed? Few candidates have such safe districts or such winsome personalities that they can forego large party or PAC contributions and still expect to beat a better-financed opponent.

If Essential Estrogen has the moral landscape right, they have endorsed a vicious circle. The status quo will keep electing candidates who were financed with special interest money until the Governor signs a new law ending the system. But we can’t get there unless legislators break out of the circle by jilting all their contributors when they vote to end privately paid campaigns. Those contributors want to maintain their influence, so all who vote for VOICE will be acting similarly to Pettengill.

Legislators who act primarily in the interest of major contributors aren’t dancing with those that brung them so much as they are dancing like puppets on a string. Is that a party candidates really want to attend?

An outspoken opponent of paper trails has been appointed to oversee Iowa elections by the newly elected Secretary of State Michael Mauro. Mauro promised to get paper trails during the campaign.

It’s Linn county auditor Linda “You Terrorists!” Langenberg who has been promoted to the role of deputy secretary of state. In October Langenberg said voting machine critics were practicing a “form of terrorism” in their campaign against paperless voting. During the 2005 legislative session, Langenberg was accused by a knowledgeable source of being a principle obstacle preventing progress toward a paper trail.

Her October remarks have just drawn this belated response from Green party’s candidate for Lt Gov, Richard Johnson:

Needless to say, I was rather surprised that you, a county auditor, were so poorly informed regarding the potential hazards of these paperless electronic voting machines you were defending. I responded, along with my running mate Wendy Barth, to your comments by mentioning how easily these small computers can be compromised, or “hacked” to use the vernacular.

The article further states, Ms. Langenberg, that you believe that because these machines are never connected to the Internet they are safe from such problems. Having spent nearly a quarter century working with computers, with the last fourteen as a technology coordinator in a school with some 400 computers connected to our LAN/WAN, I can assure you that lack of Internet exposure is no guarantee against problems. . . .
Ms. Langenberg, by comparing those of us who question the reliability of paperless electronic voting to terrorists, and by accusing us of undermining voter confidence in the system, you have done the citizens of your county, and even the state, a grave disservice. . . .[T]hose of us questioning this “advancement” in voting systems do not wish to undermine voter confidence. We want to build that confidence by insuring that elected officials, such as yourself, both understand the problem and take action to prevent a similar incident[a reference to the current missing votes in Sarasota–ed] from happening in our state or, more specifically, in your county.

Looks like Johnson held his ire too long.

This is no way to improve elections, Mr Mauro. Can you explain this appointment?

Wendy Barth, Green Party candidate for Governor, and her running mate Richard Johnson, both more knowledgeable about computers than most Iowa county auditors, have jointly rebutted the comments of Linn county auditor Linda Langenberg:

In a recent news article Langenberg referred to those who raise concerns about the accuracy of electronic voting machines as “terrorists.”

“As a career software engineer, I understand just how easily errors in programming code can be overlooked,” Barth responded, “and how difficult it can be to thoroughly test a piece of software this complex. In addition, it has been demonstrated by several testing groups that these machines can be compromised rather easily. Given this the concerns of the public are legitimate, and are deserving of consideration by the Auditor. I understand that Ms. Langenberg feels she deserves to be trusted, but the voting public deserve more reassurance than a simple ‘trust me.??

Barth’s running mate, Richard Johnson, added, “Having spent the last fifteen years of my career as a network engineer I can assure you that the risk of intrusion into these computers is real. There are documented instances where the computers controlling these voting machines have not only been “hacked,” to use the popular term, but where results have been changed without the operators being able to detect it. I cannot understand someone dismissing these threats so lightly.”

Recent testing by Princeton University
(http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting) has demonstrated how vulnerable these computers are, and how easily intrusion into these computers can be hidden. There have also been numerous reports of errors from these voting machines reported in Ohio, Florida, and Georgia. A number of states and counties are requiring that the machines have a verifiable paper trail that includes a receipt for the voter and a printed verification report.

At a meeting of supporters in Cedar Rapids earlier today, Barth announced, “Our campaign is calling for an independent audit of the code used to program these machines by qualified software engineers, as well as a real paper trail with receipt that can be verified by the voter as they cast their ballot. Every electronic cash register in the state prints receipts, so why not our voting machines? It is inexcusable that the gambling equipment in our casinos, which must pass regular independent inspection, is subjected to a higher level of scrutiny than our voting machines.”

Which is better—-a well understood way of counting votes or a proprietary, secret way of counting? Seems like an easy choice to me. But our candidates for Chief Vote Counter are willing to accept secrecy, as we learn from their answers to part 5 of the Iowans for Voting Integrity survey:

5. Currently, voting machine software is a proprietary secret, and cannot be examined—even by elections officials. The only examination of software is by the Independent Testing Authorities, which are selected and paid for by the vendors and therefore may have a conflict of interest. Leading computer science experts and voting integrity groups are calling for public disclosure of voting machine software, which would still preserve patent and copyright protection. Where do you stand on this issue?

Hanusa:

-The public disclosure of software, while still preserving patent and copyright protection, is not always possible, and may not be desirable. Making software used in electronic voting systems available to the public would make it easier for hackers to write harmful viruses and other malicious programs. Careful review and continued discussion of this issue is necessary. The sort of checking processes called for in HR550 may help here.

Mauro:

This is another reason why paper trail is imperative.

Both answers indicate acceptance of secret vote counting software. Both will try to compensate for it, but neither wants to end it.

Hanusa falls for the fallacy known as “security thru obscurity”, which is discredited by computer security professionals. Secret programming is more likely to contain mistakes than publicly available programming. And why would she want the SoS to know less about how votes are counted than some temp worker at the vendor’s programming sub-contractor?

Open source works. It works for Firefox browsers. It works for Linux. (Who hacks Linux?) I can no more alter an open source program than I can alter the morning newspaper after it is printed and made public. But I can sure see the errors! (Thanks to Justin Moore for the comparison)

More than one voting machine company has already told California that they will reveal their software IF it becomes state law that they do so. I don’t think they fear giving any help to hackers by making their wares public.

So this is the biggest disappointment in the questionaire.

Let’s wrap it up with the last two questions:

6. The DRE touchscreens were advanced by HAVA in the interest of making the voting process accessible to citizens with impaired physical or visual abilities. Given the existence of alternative equipment for accessible voting that is based on a paper ballot (such as Ballot Marking Devices or the Vote-PAD system) do you see any need to abandon paper-based voting to accommodate the disabled?
Hanusa:

No.

Mauro:

No I do not. Currently in Polk County people with disabilities us the automark machine, which still provides a paper trail. The abandonment of a paper trail does not need to occur to accommodate the disabled. The integrity of the system should be maintained for every voter and requiring a paper trail is the only method to do this.

7. Iowa recently announced a program for email voting for overseas military personnel. In this plan, voters sacrifice the secrecy of their ballot. In 2004, a similar Pentagon plan was roundly criticized by voting security experts[2]. What is your view of email voting?

Hanusa:

E-mail voting sacrifices the secrecy of the ballot(s), and also has the potential for misuse, manipulation, and other types of fraudulent activities. The current technology is not yet sufficient to supply the level of confidence and security that voters need for elections, but as technology changes, further review and consideration should be given to this matter.

Mauro:

The implementation of this process is an additional option for overseas military personnel who are burdened by location and military duty and may not have adequate access to normal absentee processes. As Secretary of State I will continue to encourage every Iowan overseas to use normal absentee methods to ensure ballot secrecy, however when service men and women located in combat zones lack the ability to request the normal process, these individuals deserve additional access to the fundamental right of voting.

There you have it, folks: The best coverage of the Iowa Secretary of State’s race you will find anywhere. You have two weeks to ponder your choice. Vote by November 7th.

Iowans for Voting Integrity have questioned the candidates for Secretary of State. The first two questions were in yesterday’s post.

Today we see both candidates being careful not to offend the private corporations that have usurped vote counting in our elections. While Hanusa takes this as a given and merely urges “oversight” of the process by our public officials, Mauro actually wants to increase the public’s authority over elections so that we can hold the corporatcrats to high standards. What a sad state of affairs we are in!

Question #3. With the advent of new electronic voting equipment, auditors and other elections officials have become increasingly reliant on the private sector to supply the machines, the training, the technical support, and often the ballot configuration files. Do you feel this is a satisfactory situation, and if not, what can be done to improve it?

Hanusa:

We have relied on contractors and vendors from private companies for many years. The source of the voting equipment is not so much the issue as is its use. County auditors should be assisted by the Secretary of State’s office to make sure procedures are proper and that there is careful oversight by the local election officials(emphasis added by JD) in the process. Trained and vigilant election workers are key.

Mauro:

Currently there are two vendors that provide equipment and ballots to County Auditors in the State of Iowa. This makes it very difficult for these auditors to maintain control over expectations because the competition is so limited.

During the current election cycle there were roughly 20 counties that did not receive their ballots on time due to delays from the vendors. I plan to require state level contract provisions that would grant the auditors more authority over their own election operations. (emphasis added by JD) These contract requirements would require companies to deliver ballots on time, meet statewide standards and laws, and ensure that there would be uniformity of performance across the state and that county auditors would not be at the mercy of a small number of vendors.

Since elections officials are more reliant on these private sector entities to supply the machines, the training, technical support and in some cases the ballot configuration files, it is imperative that we hold these companies to high statewide accepted standards to ensure that the integrity of our election process in the State of Iowa remains intact.

Next up is the question of election auditing: that is, counting by hand/eye all the ballots in random precincts to see if the scanner or touchscreen tallied the ballots correctly. Hanusa oddly endorses this with a one word answer, despite not mentioning the need for any paper trail at all in question #2. Mauro (perhaps inadvertantly?) fails to answer the question directly, even though he endorses “anything” that helps ensure the integrity of elections

4. Proposed federal legislation (HR 550, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act) would require random audits of two percent of precincts, to validate that votes are being accurately counted electronically. Would you support a similar measure at the state level?

Hanusa:

Yes.

Mauro:

I fully support H.R. 550 because it amends the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper trail. I support anything that helps to ensure the security and integrity of the process. Most importantly, I believe testing needs to occur prior the election, including sign offs and certifications from election personnel managing the election process. All testing certifications should be should be made available to the public for inspection.

But don’t get your hopes up, dear voter/reader. Tomorrow we get to question #5 and see that neither candidate endorses a perfectly good idea that would “ensure the security and integrity of the process.”

Secretary of State candidates Mary Ann Hanusa and Michael Mauro have answered seven questions put to them by Iowans for Voting Integrity. Having read through them just once, my first impressions are that both have resigned themselves to the use of vote counting software that is a corporate secret (!) and that Hanusa missed a chance to say she supports paper trails. Hanusa is cool with the corporate takeover of election administration whereas Mauro is more critical.

But don’t take my word for it. You can read the whole thing yourself. Here’s the first question that was posed to the candidates:

What do you see as the biggest challenge for the next Iowa Secretary of State, with respect to administering elections?

Here is Hanusa’s reply:

Balancing the public’s desire to use available technology to generate fast and accurate election results with the need to generate complete confidence in the entire election process. The voters need to be able to trust the technology, and part of this trust will be built on explaining why they can have confidence in the particular system they are using, in particular, what safeguards are in place to ensure accuracy and fairness.

Here is Mauro’s reply:

There are many challenges facing the next Secretary of State. The implications of policy decisions made with the Help America Vote Act (H.A.V.A), have changed the requirements of the office across the country. The biggest challenges lie with the election equipment and additional human capital to support the equipment. If elected Secretary of State, I think it is important to maintain the integrity of our elections by making sure every vote counts. I also want to make voting efficient, easy and accessible for all eligible Iowans.

I don’t like Hanusa’s talk about “trust”. Elections are a place for checks and balances, the glare of publicity, and public skepticism. No trusting types need apply. That’s why Iowa law requires every poll be staffed by members of two different political parties. But we now we ask those pollworkers to stand by in ignorance while we let the actual vote counting be done with software written secretly by anonymous distant corporations whom we are now asked to trust, but not to question.

Here’s the second question:

A recent Princeton University study[link] found that Diebold TS touch screen machines were vulnerable to dangerous security attacks. To quote, “malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates.” These machines are close cousins of the TSx machines being used in Iowa. What are your views on the use of these machines?

Hanusa:

The key to continuing to use existing machines is limiting the access (other than to voters) to a trained, technically savvy, and vigilant staff who can maintain and monitor the machines, and so prevent misuse.

Mauro:

This is a great question and it is imperative to understand the facts and then focus on the policy decisions that need to be implemented to ensure the integrity of our voting system. First, we must require a paper trail regardless of the equipment that is used. Without a paper trail any manipulations of the system will go unidentified.

Princeton computer professor, Edward W. Felten, wrote in his paper, “Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine,” that there are real dangers of the election system being hacked by simply accessing a machine’s memory card. This type of manipulation of the system is a reality in this day in age and should be planned for in case such an atrocity occurs. Paper trails are the best way to catch any manipulation of the system. Electron Diebold Voting Machines cannot be used without paper trails due to the many security risks that exist according to Felten’s paper. Whether the Diebold Voting Machine or an optical scanner is used, a paper trail is necessary so the voter can confirm their choices. As with everything, there is always human error, but by requiring people to review their ballots, it ensures that any mistakes that occurred, any manipulations of the system, or any irregular occurrences will be identified and dealt with almost immediately.

So there it was: a chance to endorse paper trails. Mauro seized it, but Hanusa thinks everything will be fine if she can hire only “trained, technically savvy, and vigilant staff.” I wonder if that includes the pollworkers. “Technically savvy” does not describe the folks who last worked my local polling place.

Besides, the point of the Princeton hack is that it’s virtually untraceable. Hanusa needs to study up!

Five more questions to go. Come back soon to read the rest.

Senator Kerry was in Iowa today campaigning for President for Michael Mauro. I heard Kerry on the radio this afternoon warning against paperless voting. He was citing the Princeton hack of Diebold’s paperless wonder.

I raised the paperless voting issue with Kerry myself in 2003 at a reception in Spencer one night after he had been to the Clay county fair. His answer was that I shouldn’t worry about election mismanagement because he planned to have attorneys at polls everywhere if he became the candidate in 2004.

Well, he did become the candidate and he did have a fleet of attorneys working for him. But his answer was ignorant–as if any attorney could tell whether the voting machine was working honestly or not! Typical lawyer arrogance, I thought.

Of course, at the time no Ivy League university had weighed in regarding voting machines. The cries of “Wolf” were coming only from the boondocks: U of Iowa, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Rice—you know, not places Kerry ever heard of.

“A modest political investment in electing clean candidates to the key Secretary of State offices is an efficient way to protect the election in 2008.”

That’s the pitch at a website which has endorsed SoS candidates in seven states, including Iowa. They even claim to have raised over $8000 for Iowa’s candidate, Democrat Mike Mauro of Des Moines. That figure is up more than $1000 since I first saw the website a week ago, so business is pretty brisk, I’d say. Mauro is third highest beneficiary of their fundraising.

Here’s a bit from their endorsement of Mauro:

Mauro believes a photo ID requirement would make it harder for some citizens to vote and says that “life circumstance should not make a person a disenfranchised voter.” Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack has been a vocal supporter of Mauro’s candidacy, praising Mauro’s efforts to simplify the registration process and make voting more accessible. Mauro supports a voter verified paper trail.

The website is a project of Democratic activist James Rucker of California. The endorsed candidates are all Democrats, but the project is not authorized by any candidate.

Wendy Barth, Green Party candidate for Iowa governor, reports on her speech this weekend at the Iowa Farmers Union meeting, where candidate Culver also spoke. Chet must be feeling a bit above it all, judging by Barth’s spin on the event–

Chet Culver came in, shook everyone’s hands, went to the podium and gave his prepared speech, shook everyone’s hands again and left without answering any questions. He did, however, finally recognize that there are more than two candidates for governor, asking me (from the podium) for the correct tally. Why should I know that better than the Secretary of State? (the rumor is that there are 5 - Republican, Democrat, Green, Libertarian and Socialist Workers.)

Good point, Wendy. Culver should know who is running. They all registered at his office. Pretty condescending, if you ask me.

How cynical I am. I immediately jump to the conclusion that if Secretary of State and would be Governor Chet Culver is passing out leftover HAVA money just weeks before the election, it must have something to do with making him look good. And a nice contrast to opponent Jim Nussle, whose guidance of the House budget committee in Washington has dealt in deficits for the entirety of Nussle’s reign.

I wonder if this is the same money once dangled before auditors as possible payment for voting machine printers. Getting the printers would have been a point for Culver. But looking like a frugal administrator is probably worth two or three points.

Chet not stupid, indeed.

The woman who would be in charge of Iowa elections votes here but lives in another state. How cool is that!

Mary Ann Hanusa is a Council Bluffs native. She was named Monday by the Republican Party as its candidate for Secretary of State. She lives in Virginia.

News accounts have alleged that she votes in Iowa. She has worked at the White House for FIVE YEARS. I’d say that’s long enough to establish residence, unless she’s still commuting.

Why does she vote here? Elected Congressman have an excuse for living in DC while voting in their home state. Political wannabes who merely work in DC for years on end for whoever will hire them have no excuse for pretending to be Iowa residents.

It’s even covered in the Iowa code 48A.5(3):

3. If a person who meets the requirements set forth in subsection 2 moves to a new residence, either in Iowa or outside Iowa, and does not meet the voter requirements at the person’s new residence, the person may vote at the person’s former precinct in Iowa until the person meets the voter requirements of the person’s new residence. However, a person who has moved to a new residence and fails to register to vote at the person’s new residence after becoming eligible to do so shall not be entitled to vote at the person’s former precinct in Iowa.(emphasis added)

Looks to me like she is violating the laws she wants to be in charge of! Would that be the “voter fraud” we sometimes hear about from Republicans?

Republicans finally found a volunteer to run for Secretary of State. She is Council Bluffs native Mary Ann Hanusa, currently of Washington, D. C.

Hanusa has experience as a secretary, all right: She’s been drafting letters for President Bush for several years, pulling down $58.700. Before that she handled correspondence for Bush senior, and was later an aide to Senator Grassley.

So far no indication that she knows anything about election administration, voting machines, open source software, or election audits.