DM Register on Voting Machines
Thursday, November 2nd, 2006Register reporter Jennifer Jacobs has written a primer on Iowa’s voting machines and why they get criticized. She also quotes Charlie Krogmeier telling a whopper:
“We try to be exhaustive in testing the combinations of votes, and if the machines have been programmed to, say, shave off every 10th vote, that should pop up,” he said.
When I went to watch the testing in Pocahontas before the June primary no candidate got ten votes, so they could not detect any vote-shaving as Krogmeier claims. Typically each candidate got one vote to see if it was being read by the machine.
Furthermore they tested the machine in “TEST MODE” but ran it in a different mode on election day.
Besides, any clever programmer wanting to steal an election would be smart enough to hide his theft, as described in the Brennan Center report:
“There are a number of techniques that could be used to ensure that testing does not detect the attack program.
” The attack program could note the time and date on the voting machine’s clock, and only trigger when the time and date are consistent with an election. This method could, by itself, prevent detection during vendor testing, Logic and Accuracy Testing and Acceptance Testing, but not during Parallel Testing.
” The attack program could observe behavior that is consistent with a test (as opposed to actual voter behavior). For example, if Logic and Accuracy Testing is known never to take more than four hours, the attack program could wait until the seventh hour to trigger. (Note that the attack becomes more difficult if the protocol for testing varies from election to election).
” The attack program could activate only when it receives some communication from the attacker or her confederates. For example, some specific pattern of interaction between the voter or election official and the voting machine may be used to trigger the attack behavior. This is often called a “Cryptic Knock.”
Thanks to Sean for finding that quote.
The Register also editorializes on the subject. I’ll go along with many of their conclusions, since this is Iowa after all. Especially I like the point about decentralized election administration.
They make one error, however. The counting is NOT done by local auditors. It is done by the voting machine software, which no auditor is allowed to inspect. Elections are not as decentralized as we like to think.