SoS Candidates Answer IVI Questions
Secretary of State candidates Mary Ann Hanusa and Michael Mauro have answered seven questions put to them by Iowans for Voting Integrity. Having read through them just once, my first impressions are that both have resigned themselves to the use of vote counting software that is a corporate secret (!) and that Hanusa missed a chance to say she supports paper trails. Hanusa is cool with the corporate takeover of election administration whereas Mauro is more critical.
But don’t take my word for it. You can read the whole thing yourself. Here’s the first question that was posed to the candidates:
What do you see as the biggest challenge for the next Iowa Secretary of State, with respect to administering elections?
Here is Hanusa’s reply:
Balancing the public’s desire to use available technology to generate fast and accurate election results with the need to generate complete confidence in the entire election process. The voters need to be able to trust the technology, and part of this trust will be built on explaining why they can have confidence in the particular system they are using, in particular, what safeguards are in place to ensure accuracy and fairness.
Here is Mauro’s reply:
There are many challenges facing the next Secretary of State. The implications of policy decisions made with the Help America Vote Act (H.A.V.A), have changed the requirements of the office across the country. The biggest challenges lie with the election equipment and additional human capital to support the equipment. If elected Secretary of State, I think it is important to maintain the integrity of our elections by making sure every vote counts. I also want to make voting efficient, easy and accessible for all eligible Iowans.
I don’t like Hanusa’s talk about “trust”. Elections are a place for checks and balances, the glare of publicity, and public skepticism. No trusting types need apply. That’s why Iowa law requires every poll be staffed by members of two different political parties. But we now we ask those pollworkers to stand by in ignorance while we let the actual vote counting be done with software written secretly by anonymous distant corporations whom we are now asked to trust, but not to question.
Here’s the second question:
A recent Princeton University study[link] found that Diebold TS touch screen machines were vulnerable to dangerous security attacks. To quote, “malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates.” These machines are close cousins of the TSx machines being used in Iowa. What are your views on the use of these machines?
Hanusa:
The key to continuing to use existing machines is limiting the access (other than to voters) to a trained, technically savvy, and vigilant staff who can maintain and monitor the machines, and so prevent misuse.
Mauro:
This is a great question and it is imperative to understand the facts and then focus on the policy decisions that need to be implemented to ensure the integrity of our voting system. First, we must require a paper trail regardless of the equipment that is used. Without a paper trail any manipulations of the system will go unidentified.
Princeton computer professor, Edward W. Felten, wrote in his paper, “Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine,” that there are real dangers of the election system being hacked by simply accessing a machine’s memory card. This type of manipulation of the system is a reality in this day in age and should be planned for in case such an atrocity occurs. Paper trails are the best way to catch any manipulation of the system. Electron Diebold Voting Machines cannot be used without paper trails due to the many security risks that exist according to Felten’s paper. Whether the Diebold Voting Machine or an optical scanner is used, a paper trail is necessary so the voter can confirm their choices. As with everything, there is always human error, but by requiring people to review their ballots, it ensures that any mistakes that occurred, any manipulations of the system, or any irregular occurrences will be identified and dealt with almost immediately.
So there it was: a chance to endorse paper trails. Mauro seized it, but Hanusa thinks everything will be fine if she can hire only “trained, technically savvy, and vigilant staff.” I wonder if that includes the pollworkers. “Technically savvy” does not describe the folks who last worked my local polling place.
Besides, the point of the Princeton hack is that it’s virtually untraceable. Hanusa needs to study up!
Five more questions to go. Come back soon to read the rest.