Archive for August, 2006

New Iowa Rules On Voting Machine Preparation

Thursday, August 31st, 2006

The Iowa Secretary of State yesterday published proposed new rules for counties to follow when they prepare voting machines for the next election. The rules detail what test ballots must be used and also split the pre-election testing of the machine into two parts. Ballot scanners and touchscreen terminals are treated separately. These rules look like an effort to prevent Pottawattamie’s error from recurring.

The rules also deal with “inactive” voters, paper trails, recounts, and election day equipment failures.

But here’s the most important part:

Any interested person may make written suggestions or comments on these proposed amendments through September 19, 2006. Written suggestions or comments should be directed to Sandy Steinbach, Director of Elections, First Floor, Lucas State Office Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.
Persons who want to convey their views orally should contact the Secretary of State’s office at (515)281–5823 or visit the Secretary of State’s offices on the first floor of the Lucas State Office Building. Requests for a public hearing must be received by 4:30 p.m. on September 18, 2006.

So speak now. Or stick around for observations that I will post, and then speak your piece. Public comment periods are the guts of democracy in a bureaucracy. I’ll bet you can comment by email if you put “public comment to Sandy Steinbach” in the subject line. This address appears on the state department’s website :
sos@sos.state.ia.us

You can find the proposals in the Administrative Bulletin here, but you must look way down the page for the Secretary of State (721) portion. It begins at their page 307 and continues to 313.

Alice in Wonderfornia

Monday, August 28th, 2006

I have been urging the creators of Vote-PAD to come to Iowa and get their invention certified for use in our elections. (Vote-PAD is a low-tech way to assist disabled voters with ballot marking.) There is currently no market here for their product since our counties already have bought more expensive high tech gadgets that purport to assist some disabled voters, so the Vote-PAD people have not attempted to get Iowa certification.

Instead they went to Wonderland California. But the Queen of California laid a trap for them. On Friday California denied them certification, following the most bizarre certification process imaginable. Vote-PAD has responded with this satire of the California decision. Here’s a taste:

The Queen started by describing the testing process, “We asked them to vote independently on the Vote-PAD, and we told them exactly what to do the entire time.”

“Excuse me,” said Alice, “but how is that independent?”

“That’s not the point,” said the Queen. “The point is that they weren’t able to vote independently.”

“But you didn’t let them,” objected Alice.

The state announced its decision on a Friday. Last winter it was also a Friday when they certified Diebold’s touchscreens despite a report saying the Diebold system violated federal standards. Friday is when many government agencies announce things that are embarrassing to them because fewer people see the newspaper on Saturdays.

I still hope Vote-PAD comes to Iowa. I think they would get a fair hearing from the Iowa board of voting machine examiners. Then if some county has trouble with their Diebolds, an alternative would already be certified.

Barth Skewers Culver

Sunday, August 27th, 2006

Wendy Barth, Green Party candidate for Iowa governor, reports on her speech this weekend at the Iowa Farmers Union meeting, where candidate Culver also spoke. Chet must be feeling a bit above it all, judging by Barth’s spin on the event–

Chet Culver came in, shook everyone’s hands, went to the podium and gave his prepared speech, shook everyone’s hands again and left without answering any questions. He did, however, finally recognize that there are more than two candidates for governor, asking me (from the podium) for the correct tally. Why should I know that better than the Secretary of State? (the rumor is that there are 5 - Republican, Democrat, Green, Libertarian and Socialist Workers.)

Good point, Wendy. Culver should know who is running. They all registered at his office. Pretty condescending, if you ask me.

Culver Distributes Cash; Gets Good Press

Thursday, August 24th, 2006

How cynical I am. I immediately jump to the conclusion that if Secretary of State and would be Governor Chet Culver is passing out leftover HAVA money just weeks before the election, it must have something to do with making him look good. And a nice contrast to opponent Jim Nussle, whose guidance of the House budget committee in Washington has dealt in deficits for the entirety of Nussle’s reign.

I wonder if this is the same money once dangled before auditors as possible payment for voting machine printers. Getting the printers would have been a point for Culver. But looking like a frugal administrator is probably worth two or three points.

Chet not stupid, indeed.

Wanted: 3000 Old Paper Ballots

Wednesday, August 23rd, 2006

All over America the ballots from the 2004 election are still in storage. Federal law requires that they be retained for 22 months after the election. The time is about to expire.

County election officials in some states may have the authority to dispose of these ballots in any way they wish next month when the time elapses. They won’t bring much on Ebay, so mostly they will be discarded. But some people would like to get them. Maybe you can arrange it.

A Wisconsin voting machine expert (John Washburn) is seeking 3000 actual paper ballots. He has asked his local election supervisor, but she has said she intends to destroy the ballots.

Washburn wants the ballots in order to demonstrate a new way to “hand count” paper ballots(How to Count Thousands
of Paper Ballots by Hand
). He will use a super sensitive scale instead of thumbing through the ballots while he counts. His scale can detect weights to a fraction of a gram. Ballots weigh more than 20 grams. So a stack of ballots could be counted far more accurately by weighing them than by thumbing them.

Here is Washburn’s request:

Does this work? Work fast enough? Work with multi-race ballots? Have sufficient check and balances and security to minimize fraud?

I want to get real world, empirical evidence of the viability of this proposal (or lack therof). I want to video record the whole 6-7 hours to DVD. The availability of the raw video as well as 30 second, 1 minute, 10 minute, and 30 minute versions is to blunt claims I have presented this in an out of context way.

I have a scale company here willing to lend me a $1500 high capacity, high sensitivity counting scale for nothing more than prominent product placement in the resulting video.

I have a film crew available (camera, lights, sound, and director) willing to donate the equipment and time in exchange for the copyright to the result and credit toward their film degree.

What I don’t have is a set of real ballots to sort, weigh and count. The 22 month retention period for the November 2, 2004 election materials expires on September 2, 2006 . What is more realistic than actual ballots as marked by actual voters?

What I need:
1) 3,000 or more ballots from November 2, 2004.
The ballots:
a) Need not all be from the same jurisdiction.
b) Must have the same ballots structure; i.e. the same set of races with the same set candidates printed in the same order.
c) Must be printed on discrete, uniform pieces of paper; the heavier the better. Optically scanned ballots would be best. But ballots from a Populex systemor Proofs of votes from an AccuPoll system would work as well. VVPAT toilet paper (Not discrete) or cut and dropped VVPAT will not work (not cut to uniform lengths).
d) Have at least 8 races on it.

Can anyone help me find a jurisdiction with ballots from polling places which meet my selection criteria? On September 3, 2006 ballots from jurisdictions all across the country will be in dumpsters. I would like to rescue some of this trash and put it to good use.

One Florida county has decided to donate its ballots to a university for use by researchers. Washburn can go to Florida to do his research, if necessary. But if we can help, it should not be necessary.

Unfortunately Iowa law requires the destruction of old ballots, so please pass this request on to others. Have them reply to Blog@WashburnResearch.Org if they can secure the ballots. Or they can comment here or email me.

The Best Systems Have The Fewest Secrets

Thursday, August 17th, 2006

The other night on CNN Lou Dobbs bemoaned the appearance of old voting machines on the auction block at Ebay. He worried that villians would learn how to steal elections if they got access to the equipment. This time Lou missed the point in his otherwise admirable coverage of the voting machine mess brought on by the Help America Vote Act.

What should concern Dobbs is all the secrecy that surrounds the system and the programming for the vote counting gadgets. Only ONE thing shoud be secret about elections–how you mark your ballot. Here’s computer scientist Justin Moore on why this is the goal:

The best systems have the fewest secrets. Anything that needs to be kept secret — such as a password, an encryption key, a physical building key — in order for the system to work securely is a potential point of attack.

The more things that need to be kept secret or secure, the more points of attack.

“Whoops, you can load a new OS [operating system] with a PC card! Better secure it.”

“Whoops, you can modify the audit trail without an
application password. Better keep the OS login secret.” Etc, etc.

The best systems are the ones where you can hand over the entire
source code to the attacker, and they still can’t get anywhere. In
other words, the source code reveals no points of attack, and no longer needs to be secret.

But today’s corporate voting machines are so poorly designed and programmed (that’s the charitable view) that they depend on locked storage, passwords, security tape and other devices to protect their “integrity.”

It won’t work.

Hanusa Lives in Virginia, Votes Here

Tuesday, August 15th, 2006

The woman who would be in charge of Iowa elections votes here but lives in another state. How cool is that!

Mary Ann Hanusa is a Council Bluffs native. She was named Monday by the Republican Party as its candidate for Secretary of State. She lives in Virginia.

News accounts have alleged that she votes in Iowa. She has worked at the White House for FIVE YEARS. I’d say that’s long enough to establish residence, unless she’s still commuting.

Why does she vote here? Elected Congressman have an excuse for living in DC while voting in their home state. Political wannabes who merely work in DC for years on end for whoever will hire them have no excuse for pretending to be Iowa residents.

It’s even covered in the Iowa code 48A.5(3):

3. If a person who meets the requirements set forth in subsection 2 moves to a new residence, either in Iowa or outside Iowa, and does not meet the voter requirements at the person’s new residence, the person may vote at the person’s former precinct in Iowa until the person meets the voter requirements of the person’s new residence. However, a person who has moved to a new residence and fails to register to vote at the person’s new residence after becoming eligible to do so shall not be entitled to vote at the person’s former precinct in Iowa.(emphasis added)

Looks to me like she is violating the laws she wants to be in charge of! Would that be the “voter fraud” we sometimes hear about from Republicans?

Republicans to Run Hanusa

Monday, August 14th, 2006

Republicans finally found a volunteer to run for Secretary of State. She is Council Bluffs native Mary Ann Hanusa, currently of Washington, D. C.

Hanusa has experience as a secretary, all right: She’s been drafting letters for President Bush for several years, pulling down $58.700. Before that she handled correspondence for Bush senior, and was later an aide to Senator Grassley.

So far no indication that she knows anything about election administration, voting machines, open source software, or election audits.

Auditors and the Rate of Paperless Voting

Sunday, August 13th, 2006

It must make a difference who the auditor is when a county faces optional paperless voting. The rate at which voters used the paperless machines when perfectly good paper ballots were at hand varied ENORMOUSLY from one county to another in the June primary.

In the average county with both paper ballots and paperless touchscreen terminals about 27% of the voters were suckered into using the less desirable paperless method, according to a survey by Iowans for Voting Integrity.

In Scott County, where Karen Fitzsimmons is auditor, only 1.7% of the votes were cast on touchscreens. Fitzsimmons wins the prize for keeping this technology in its place.

On the other hand, in Emmet county,where Beverly Juhl is auditor, 75% of the voters used the touchscreen. That’s the highest rate in the state.

How can this be? Maybe you think the big urban eastern Iowa county (Scott) just has a different culture from the small rural northwest Iowa county (Emmet). Forget that explanation: right next door to Emmet county the voters of Dickinson county used the touchscreen only 5% of the time. I’m pretty sure the cultures of these neighboring counties are similar.

In general the less populated counties saw a higher percentage of the vote go paperless. In bigger counties a voter may have to wait in line to use the only touchscreen. In deserted precincts like Laurens, the touchscreens had the appeal of a new toy. Still, some rural counties–like Mills and Decatur–kept the touchscreen totals to 5% or 6%. I’m guessing that has something to do with their auditors, Carol Robertson and William Greenwood.

Actually I tried to find out what auditor Juhl and her neighboring auditor Nancy Reiman of Dickinson county had to say about the big difference between their two counties. Neither responded to email inquiries.

Republican SOS for SoS

Saturday, August 12th, 2006

No, I don’t have any inside information about the Republican’s sending an S-O-S because they can’t find a candidate to run for Secretary of State. But how bad is this?

Council Bluffs businessman Jeff Ballenger said he is “pretty confident” he will not run as the Republican Party candidate for Iowa Secretary of State. . . .

A member of that committee contacted Ballenger a few days ago and expressed the committee’s confidence he could be a good candidate, Ballenger said.

Ballenger was a political unknown when he ran for Congress in 2002. He ended up third in a four-person race, finishing ahead of a longtime state lawmaker from Sioux City.

“They (the committee) said I had the energy and the ability to win the secretary of state race, and they seemed to think I still have name recognition,” Ballenger said.

Name recognition? Jeff Ballenger???? Who’s that?

Ballenger evidently saw through that flattery.

Paperless Plague Swept Iowa June 6

Monday, August 7th, 2006

Update–error corrected below: Linn county DID reply to the survey.

****************

Iowa’s June 6 primary was plagued with paperless voting. According to a survey of Iowa auditors, at least 21% of the votes were cast on touchscreen terminals that left no voter verified paper trail.

This wasn’t supposed to happen, according to the prognostications of the Iowa Secretary of State. Although Secretary Culver lobbied for the passage of a paper trail requirement in the legislature this winter, he was calm when the bill was waylaid by Representative Libby Jacobs and others in her party. We were supposed to be soothed by the fact that some 93% of polling places would nonetheless have paper ballots or paper trails.

But many counties have two voting machines. One leaves a trail and one is paperless. What would the voters actually do?

After the election the SoS had no idea what the voters actually did. Counties were not asked to report this information. Iowans for Voting Integrity did this work for you, surveying all counties that used two systems at the polls. Most surveyed counties–43 of the 59–responded.

If we tally just the reported touchscreen votes, we get 21% voting on vapor. This does not include some of the biggest counties, whose auditors–Mary Mosiman in Story county and Linda Langenburg in Linn county–did not report their figures despite repeated requests. IVI president Carole Simmons estimates the final figure at 25%

The problem of paperless votes is thus at least three times as big as Culver’s office acknowledges. Luckily for Iowa the only known ballot miscounting occurred in a county with 100% paper, so it got fixed.

Close call.

Potholes on the Iowa Paper Trail

Sunday, August 6th, 2006

Several Iowa counties that once planned to use paper trails as part of their touchscreen voting equipment did not do so in the June primary.

A map at the SoS website shows nine counties that announced plans to use a paper trail. But a survey of auditors by Iowans for Voting Integrity reveals that only Black Hawk (Waterloo) and Story (Ames) counties actually used the printers. (Linn county did not respond to the inquiry.)

Monona, Audubon, Boone, and Henry counties purchased Diebold printers but never used them. Des Moines county never purchased printers in spite of the map’s indication that they did. Johnson (Iowa City) county was unable to purchase the printers it wanted because vendor E S & S never presented its printer to Iowa for certification.

Coming tomorrow—How many paperless votes were cast in the June 6th primary election?

Allison’s Replacement Should . . .

Saturday, August 5th, 2006

Republicans need a candidate for Iowa Secretary of State, the chief elections official in Iowa. Their “placeholder” candidate has dropped out after winning a contested primary. There must be some skeletons in his closet!!

The new candidate should . . .

A. Understand computers at least to the level of the old adage “Garbage in, garbage out.” In other words, a healthy dose of skepticism is in order. Computers can be programmed honestly, erroneously, maliciously, and surrepticiously. Hackers have caused trouble for the Department of Defense and for Microsoft. It is only a matter of time before they steal votes. Maybe they already have. This means any current county auditor who uses paperless voting equipment is disqualified for being too trusting.

B. Believe in auditing elections even if it means exposing his/her own errors. This means we need something worth auditing, namely a written ballot verified by the voter. Audits should be regular, widespread, and random.

C. Insist on public control of all aspects of the election. That includes the software that runs any computers and the maintenance of any hardware that the state or county uses to facilitate election administration. Control should not be in private hands, whether corporate hands, candidate hands, or criminal hands.

Those three steps will go far to make elections transparent. Now as for making them open, a good candidate will

D. Advocate for a new registration regime for poltical parties. Iowa law prohibits registration for any party except Republican or Democrat. The Green Party currently has a lawsuit pending with Secretary Culver on this matter.

E. Advocate for public funding for campaigns. We all know that “who ever pays the piper calls the tune.” The public should pay the campaign expenses so that we can call the tunes when the legislature convenes.

F. Advocate for instant runoff voting (IRV) in Iowa’s non-partisan races for mayor. Currently a second runoff election is ordered if a candidate fails to get a majority in the first round. This is expensive and needless. The IRV system can do it all at once.

Who can be this candidate?

CNN covers Pottawattamie Miscount

Tuesday, August 1st, 2006

The CNN program Moneyline has been covering voting machines intermittently for some weeks now. Monday they reported on Iowa:

DOBBS: More evidence tonight that the security of our elections, the integrity of our democracy are at risk from electronic voting machines. A county in Iowa has just come close to putting the wrong candidate in office because of a massive programming error.

Kitty Pilgrim has the report.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

KITTY PILGRIM, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice over): On June 6th, in Iowa’s Pottawattamie County, the early electronic vote tally showed a popular 23-year incumbent losing to a 19-year-old college student. Highly suspicious, the auditors stopped the electronic count and started counting by hand. The electronic machines made by ES&S, one of the three major voting machine companies in the country, had miscounted every race on the ballot.

LOREN KNAUSS, POTTAWATTAMIE COUNTY SUPERVISOR: The discussion that we had afterwards as we started doing our review, the company, ES&S, misprogrammed the computers. And then on our side, the tests were not thorough enough. So it was — we’ll just say it was a 50-50 mistake on their side and ours.

PILGRIM: Knauss was running against 10 people in a Republican primary, and according to the voting machines, he was coming in ninth. After the manual recount, he came in first. He says without a paper trail, the election would been completely botched by the electronic machines.

Electronic voting experts have come to a conclusion over what went wrong with the ES&S machines.

JOHN WASHBURN, VOTERTRUST USA: What happened in Pottawattamie County is that they have a rule that the paper ballots, the names from precinct to precinct, have to rotate. So, while I might be at the top of the ballot in precinct one, I’d be number two in precinct two, number three in precinct three, and so on.

What the machinery did, though, is the programming didn’t take into account this rotation on the paper ballots. And so, regardless of whatever name was on the top of the ballot, it would always accrue for a single candidate.

PILGRIM: Computer experts point out in this case how the ballot was programmed was a mistake. But misprogramming ballot tabulation could also be done on purpose if someone wanted to tamper with an election.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

PILGRIM: The Iowa secretary of state says the programming by the vendor was done incorrectly. So the state is going to pay more attention to the pre-election testing of the machines.

But ES&S issued a statement saying the issue was not related to the reliability of the machines, rather error in the way the ballots were coded. It was a human error, they say.

All of this goes to prove, you really do need this paper trail.

DOBBS: Went from ninth to number one. If this message is not getting through that’s emanating from every corner of the country using these voting machines, I don’t know what it will take.

PILGRIM: I know. And when you talk to county after county after county that have these problem, they all come to the same conclusion, you must have a paper record, it seems.

DOBBS: And I love the electoral officials in these counties and districts, and in some cases states, saying we’re going to pay closer attention this time. Wouldn’t you pay close attention every time?

PILGRIM: One would hope so. It is an election.

DOBBS: Kitty, thank you very much.

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0607/31/ldt.01.html